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• In 1998, the Government of Canada adopted
a new framework for distributing its debt
securities to ﬁnancial market intermediaries
and end investors.
• Minormodiﬁcationstothecurrentframework
were implemented in December 2005 in
response to lower government borrowing
needs, the high concentration of large users
in both the primary and secondary markets
for Government of Canada securities, and
innovations such as the growth of electronic
trading.
• The key changes made to the debt distribution
frameworkwere an increase in the size of bids
that dealers can accept on behalf of customers
at auctions of Government of Canada
securities and reduced minimum bidding
requirements for primary dealers. These
changes are expected to attract continued
broad and competitive participation in
government auctions. In turn, this should
support the government’s objectives for
its debt strategy: to raise stable, low-cost
funding and to maintain a well-functioning
market.
* The author would like to thank Wendy Chan, Ashley Clark, Oumar Dissou,
and Frank Furlan for their assistance.
he federal government meets its borrowing
requirements mainly by issuing debt securi-
ties in domestic financial markets. Since the
beginning of the 1990s, the government has
issued and distributed debt securities mainly through
auctions. The debt distribution framework is important
to the Government of Canada for several reasons:
• A well-designed framework supports the
ability of the government to sell its securi-
ties on a reliable basis at the best price.
• The debt distribution framework supports
a well-functioning government securities
market by promoting broad participation
among dealers and investors. A well-func-
tioning market in turn beneﬁts the broader
Canadian ﬁxed-income market by provid-
ing investors and intermediaries with a
range of assets that are free of credit risk
and that also serve as effective pricing
benchmarks and hedging instruments. It
also allows for a more effective implemen-
tation of monetary policy. For these rea-
sons, the market for government securities
should be active, competitive, and accessi-
ble to interested parties.1
• In designing and implementing its debt dis-
tribution framework, the government aims
to create the proper mix of obligations,
privileges, and supporting arrangements
for market participants that will help it to
achieve its objectives.
1.  See Arnone and Iden (2003) and Arnone and Ugolini (2005) for a detailed
discussion on the rationale for, and objectives of, the debt distribution frame-
work.
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This article discusses how the debt distribution frame-
work has evolved over time to enable the government
to meet its debt management objectives. It begins with
a brief history, showing how the government used
the primary and secondary markets to develop the
debt distribution framework. This is followed by a
review of the most recent modifications to the frame-
work, which became effective on 13 December 2005.
A well-designed framework supports
the ability of the government to sell
its securities on a reliable basis at the
best price.
Brief History of the Debt
Distribution Framework
1867 to World War I
Before World War 1, no formal debt distribution
framework existed. The domestic capital market was
almost non-existent; there were no organized secondary
markets; and the government’s ﬁnancial requirements
were modest. The government nevertheless began
sellingdomesticdebtjustafterConfederation,inJanuary
1868, when the new Dominion of Canada called for
tenders on $1.5 million of 6 per cent 10-year bonds.2
The government planned to accept or reject bids for
various amounts of bonds at different prices, and a
sizable portion of the issue was sold directly to trustees
andexecutors,charitableinstitutions,andindividuals.
Following this ﬁrst issue, the government continued
to tender domestic bonds, using the proceeds to repay
the foreign debt (mainly denominated in sterling)
issued by the provinces before Confederation.
Between 1867 and 1900, however, roughly 91 per cent
of the ﬁnancing was still raised in sterling and in U.S.
dollars on the London and New York markets. During
that period, a limited amount of treasury bills, payable
in sterling, were issued and sold to non-Canadian
banks in the London market and in continental Europe.
World War I to 1953
With the start of World War I, the government was
increasingly forced to rely on the Canadian market to
2.  For more details, see Bank of Canada (1980) and Branion (1995).
meet its wartime ﬁnancing needs. As ﬁnancing in tra-
ditional foreign markets like the United Kingdom and
the United States became progressively less available,
given those countries’ own war-ﬁnancing needs, the
government began to issue bonds almost exclusively in
Canada. The sharp increase in the issuance of
domestic bonds in an underdeveloped domestic
market led to a change in the method of issuing
Government of Canada bonds. The tender system was
replaced by a system of syndication3 in which primary
distributors (banks and investment dealers) purchased
bonds from the government for subsequent sale to the
general public in exchange for a commission.
During World War I, large quantities of treasury bills
(in Canadian dollars) were sold directly to chartered
banks to provide financing to the government between
war bond issues. In the absence of a secondary market,
banks held treasury bills until maturity and did not
regard them as a highly liquid asset. Canadian banks
continued to use call loans in the New York market as
an important source of funds to meet sudden demands
for liquidity (see Bank of Canada 1972). The sale of
treasury bills was discontinued in the mid-1920s, and
a first auction of treasury bills was held in 1934.4 Regu-
lar fortnightly auctions were introduced in 1937.
Financing during World War II was arranged much
as it had been during Word War I, except that the
government more directly targeted retail investors,
whose savings had surged during World War II.5
Although the government’s ﬁnancial requirements
dropped signiﬁcantly after World War II, a well-devel-
oped secondary market for bonds had grown in
response to the extensive use of the domestic market
to meet the government’s borrowing needs. However,
an active secondary market for treasury bills still did
not exist.
1953 to 1998
The year 1953 was pivotal for the development of the
debtdistributionframework,whenaformaldesignation
3.  The syndication system was in place until the beginning of the 1990s.
4.  Shortly after the opening of the Bank of Canada in March 1935, the Bank,
as ﬁscal agent of the Government of Canada, was called on to provide advice
on the issuance of Dominion bonds and treasury bills, and to handle the
technical aspects of the new issues.
5.  The government issued two war loans in 1940 and nine Victory loans
between 1941 and 1945, thus providing a total of $13 billion to retail investors.
A co-operative method was established to sell these securities under the
direction of the National War Finance Committee. National, provincial, and
local committees sold the securities to individual investors, and these securi-
ties were also available through payroll deduction (Bank of Canada 1980;
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of market “jobber” for treasury bills was established.
The market-jobber function was created that year pri-
marily to develop the domestic money market to help
the Bank of Canada in the conduct of its monetary
policy. The Governor of the Bank also saw the need for
a secondary market for treasury bills to help develop
other money market instruments and to enhance the
efficiency of capital markets (see Fullerton 1986). As
part of its strategy to expand the distribution of treas-
ury bills beyond banks, the Bank invited interested
investment dealers to assume jobber responsibilities
(market-making or inventory-positioning) in exchange
for privileged access to the Bank for the financing of
their inventories of short-term (less than three years)
Government of Canada securities.6 A year later, the
Bank encouraged the chartered banks to initiate day-
to-day loans with market jobbers. These measures,
combined with other initiatives implemented in the
1950s and 1960s, provided benefits to the government
beyond those associated with the greater effectiveness
of monetary policy.7 In particular, the development of
the money market widened the investor base for short-
termgovernmentsecurities,which,inturn,contributed
to the low cost of funding for the government.
6.  Although dealers had to meet a set of requirements to obtain the status of
jobber, acquiring the designation was not limited to a set of rules. The Bank
regarded these requirements as guidelines and awarded jobber status in rec-
ognition of the dealer’s presence in the Government of Canada securities
market.
7. Providing the details of the measures implemented to develop a secondary
market for treasury bills is beyond the scope of this article. See Lundrigan and
Toll (1997) and Howard (1998) for more information.
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The development of the money market
widened the investor base for short-
term government securities, which,
in turn, contributed to the low cost of
funding for the government.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the government increased its
issuance of bonds and treasury bills to meet its growing
financing requirements (Chart 1). Along with the
growing size of the government debt (Chart 2), the
secondary market for bonds developed to the point
that the government and the Bank decided to reintro-
duce auctions for domestic marketable bonds.8 The
move began with the issuance of 2-year bonds in 1983,
followed by a gradual expansion to other maturities.
The last syndicated offering of regular coupon-bear-
ing bonds took place in December 1991, for 30-year
bonds.9 The government’s move to auctions for the
issuance of securities denominated in its domestic cur-
8.  Attracted by potential business opportunities as a result of growing gov-
ernment debt, foreign banks and dealers entered the Canadian ﬁxed-income
markets as primary distributors.
9.  For Real Return Bonds (RRBs), syndicated offerings were used until the
ﬁrst single-price (Dutch) auction, which took place in April 1995. A Dutch
auction is one where bonds are sold at the lowest accepted price (or highest
yield), i.e., the price necessary to sell the full amount of the issue.
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maintain a continuous presence in the secondary market
and to participate regularly in auctions, at prices
consistent with the fair market prices of securities. At
every auction, market jobbers had to submit bids at
reasonable prices comparable with those of their
respective secondary market share, but with no specific
requirements to win a particular amount of securities.
Dealers’ bidding limits included customers’ orders,
and auction participants were not required to report
their net positions.
1998 to 2005
In 1998, the government made several important
changes to support the integrity of the debt distribu-
tion framework.12 The changes were motivated by:
(i) expected lower auction sizes, owing to reduced
government financing requirements (see Chart 1);
(ii) the consolidation among major banks and invest-
ment dealers that had translated into increased con-
centration in the trading of Government of Canada
securities (Charts 3 and 4);13 and (iii) the growing
inﬂuence of individual market participants (investors
and dealers). Together, these factors were viewed as
having the potential to create excessive concentration
(or “squeezes”) in the Government of Canada securi-
ties market that could reduce investors’ and dealers’
12. The government published its ﬁrst discussion paper dealing with the pro-
posed changes in December 1996. A second paper was released in April 1998,
and a ﬁnal document with the new rules was published in August 1998. See
Bank of Canada (1996b, 1998a, 1998b).
13.  The concentration remained high after 1998 and was a factor in the 2005
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Bonds: Share of Secondary Market Trading
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rency was also consistent with the evolution of similar
practices among other major sovereign countries.10
In the 1970s and 1980s, along with
the growing size of the government
debt, the secondary market for bonds
developed to the point that the
government and the Bank decided to
reintroduce auctions for domestic
marketable bonds.
At that time, a maximum amount for competitive
and non-competitive bids applied for both primary
distributors and their customers.11 As well, primary
distributors and market jobbers were both expected to
10.  Most industrialized countries use a debt distribution framework to mar-
ket government securities. Compared with Canada, the debt distribution
frameworks in other developed countries tend to require fewer obligations
for dealers at auctions but more obligations in secondary markets, such as
continuous market-making and minimum trading volumes during a given
period of time.
11.  Dealers and customers were allowed to submit non-competitive bids in
addition to any competitive bids at each auction. Non-competitive bids were
allotted at the average yield of the accepted competitive bids for each tranche
of  treasury bills and nominal bonds. For RRBs, non-competitive bids were
allotted at the highest real yield of accepted bids. These rules are still in place.
Non-competitive bids were introduced to favour broad participation at auc-
tions, especially by non-sophisticated investors. Details are provided in Bank
of Canada (1993, 1996a).
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willingness to acquire and trade these securities,
thereby reducing liquidity and ultimately increasing
the government’s borrowing costs.14 Such squeezes
had occurred in the U.S. Treasury market in the early
1990s.
In response, the government introduced a number
of initiatives to maintain the integrity of the auction
process. Among the key initiatives, distinct bidding
limits were established for dealers and customers. To
reduce the risk that a market participant could accu-
mulate an undue amount of securities, bidders were
required to report their net positions in the securities
being auctioned.15 The Investment Dealers Association
of Canada (IDA) introduced its Policy No. 5, “Code
of Conduct for IDA Member Firms Trading in Domes-
tic Debt Markets,” establishing principles for trading
securities in the fixed-income market in Canada. As
well, primary distributors and market jobbers were
replaced bygovernmentsecuritiesdistributors(GSDs)
and a subgroup of GSDs, deﬁned as primary dealers
(PDs). Like market jobbers, PDs were required to main-
tain markets in Government of Canada securities,
and the new rules required minimum participation at
each auction at a reasonable price as deﬁned in the
terms of participation. This reduced the risk of holding
an “uncovered” auction in which the government
could not sell all of the securities it offered for sale.
Other GSDs were not required to make markets or to
participate at each auction of government securities.
In exchange for greater responsibilities, PDs were
granted higher bidding limits on their own behalf and
on behalf of customers than those allotted to other
GSDs.16 A further modiﬁcation was made to support
the secondary market for government securities. All
GSDs’ bidding limits at auctions were tiered, consistent
with both their performance in auctions and their trad-
ing activity in secondary markets. These modiﬁcations
14.   “Squeezes occur when an auction participant, or group of participants,
gains control of the stock of a security and withholds the supply from the cash
or repo markets” (Bank of Canada 1998a). In a market where excessive con-
centration is persistent, dealers are reluctant to post quotes, which negatively
affects the price-discovery process, thereby undermining the integrity of the
auction process and the liquidity in the secondary market.
15.  For example, a dealer or a customer might have acquired a signiﬁcant
quantity of a security that was reissued, which can be accomplished in several
ways. Section 6.2 of the “Terms of Participation in Auctions for Government
Securities Distributors” provides the rules that apply to the reporting of net
positions. The same rules can also be found in section 4.2 of the “Terms of
Participation in Auctions for Customers.” Both are available on the Bank of
Canada’s website at www.bankofcanada.ca/en/markets/markets_auct.html.
16. PDs were granted other advantages not extended to GSDs, such as being
the privileged counterparties of the Bank of Canada for the conduct of mone-
tary policy.
were also designed to achieve the balance of interests
that is necessary to make the debt distribution frame-
work effective.
2005 Revisions to the Debt
Distribution Framework
Factors leading to the review
In October 2004, the government published a consul-
tation document on the Bank of Canada’s website to
generate discussion of the potential changes to the
debt distribution framework.17 The review was moti-
vated by the continued existence of several factors
that had led to the previous review in 1998. Overall,
the analysis indicated that the debt distribution frame-
work had met its objectives of raising stable, low-cost
funding for the government while supporting a well-
functioning market.18
The analysis indicated that the debt
distribution framework had met its
objectives of raising stable, low-cost
funding for the government while
supporting a well-functioning
market.
Based on some ongoing trends, however, the govern-
ment felt that minor adjustments were warranted.
First, customers’ winnings at bond auctions had
declined steadily since 1999 (Table 1).19 The winnings
of foreign dealers had also declined compared with
those of the large domestic PDs, mainly as a result of
the departure of three U.S. PDs from the Canadian
17.  For the complete consultation document, see Bank of Canada (2004).
See also Bank of Canada (2005a, 2005b, 2005c).
18.  Changes to the debt distribution framework were supplemented by initi-
atives to maintain a well-functioning market, including focusing on regular
issuance in key maturity sectors for bonds and treasury bills, building large
and liquid benchmarks to target sizes established in consultation with market
participants, and introducing a new buyback program to support the issu-
ance of new benchmark bonds. For further details on these initiatives, see the
various annual “Debt Management Strategy” documents published on the
Department of Finance website at www.ﬁn.gc.ca/purl/dms-e.html.
19.  Customers’ winnings at RRB auctions have been higher because RRBs are
difﬁcult to obtain in the secondary market. RRBs are considered buy-and-hold
securities and are not traded as actively as other Government of Canada secu-
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fixed-income market in 2001. As well, the concentra-
tionamongthelargerdealerstradinginthesecondary
market was still high (Charts 3 and 4). In 1997, 30 deal-
ers were distributing Government of Canada securi-
ties, compared with 19 today. Finally, the government
noted an emerging trend in the greater use of electronic
systems for trading fixed-income securities. Trading
volume using electronic trading systems is growing but
is still a very small percentage of the market.
The revisions
The changes to the debt distribution framework, which
became effective on 13 December 2005, centred on two
themes: broadening access to the auctions and main-
taining the integrity of the auction process. Table 2
summarizes the changes, which are described below.
Readers may also refer to the new “Terms of Participa-
tion in Auctions for GSDs and Customers,” as well as
to the “Standard Terms,” which are available on the
Bank’s website.20
20. Details are available at www.bankofcanada.ca/en/markets/
markets_auct.html under “Rules and Terms” and “Standard Terms for
Auctions.”
Bonds, excluding Real Return Bonds
Primary dealers (PDs) 88.7 89.7 85.2 90.5 91.9 96.8 94.5
Non-PD government
securities distributors
(GSDs) 2.6 2.3 6.9 3.2 1.7 1.5 3.9
Customers 8.7 8.1 7.9 6.3 6.3 1.8 1.6
Foreign dealers* 31.4 28.6 19.0 17.9 15.9 18.6 14.0
Real Return Bonds
PDs 48.3 45.7 39.4 50.7 33.9 51.3 49.1
Non-PD GSDs 4.9 2.0 4.4 1.3 0.6 0.9 0.8
Customers 46.9 52.3 56.2 47.9 65.5 47.8 50.2
Foreign dealers* 30.6 15.4 10.0 9.1 8.6 9.2 12.4
Treasury bills
PDs 84.1 86.7 87.0 84.1 84.9 85.2 89.1
Non-PD GSDs 3.3 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.3
Customers 12.6 12.0 11.4 14.2 13.3 13.0 8.6
Foreign dealers* 16.1 13.4 14.3 13.9 8.7 12.0 13.7
Table 1
Distribution of Primary Auction
Shares among Participants (%)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
* Foreign dealers are also included in the PD or non-PD GSD categories.
1. Measures to attract broad and competitive par-
ticipation at auctions
The competitive and non-competitive bid-
ding limits that PDs and GSDs can submit
on behalf of customers were increased.
These changes were introduced to enable
dealers to accept larger orders from cus-
tomers and to provide greater access for
customers at auctions. The government
also afﬁrmed that qualifying Alternative
Trading Systems (ATSs)21 could become
GSDs. ATSs have the potential to provide an
additional channel for the government to
distribute its debt and to broaden and
increase the participation of non-sophisti-
cated investors at auctions. Finally, the gov-
ernment reduced the bidding obligations
of PDs in order to support auction partici-
pation.22
2. Measures to maintain the integrity of the auc-
tion process
All GSDs that are not PDs are required to
participate periodically in auctions. This
requirement was established to promote
active participation in auctions among a
rangeofparticipantsinthedomesticcapital
market.
The changes to the debt distribution
framework, which became effective on
13 December 2005, centred on two
themes: broadening access to the
auctions, and maintaining the
integrity of the auction process.
In designing the framework for the distribution of
Government of Canada securities, the government
sought to balance a number of interests. Broad partici-
pation is encouraged by allowing market intermediar-
ies (i.e., GSDs) and customers to bid at auctions. GSDs
21. ATSs are electronic platforms used for the trading of securities.
22.  The method of calculating the bidding limits of GSDs has also been modi-
ﬁed to better reﬂect their participation in a broad range of government securi-
ties operations. See section 9 of the “Terms of Participation in Auctions for
Government Securities Distributors” at www.bankofcanada.ca/en/auction/
aucpa1v2.pdf for additional details.43 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
enjoy a privileged status at auctions by virtue of the
requirement for customers to submit orders through
them. The resulting knowledge of customer orders
provides distributors with market information that
can help them to make more informed bids at auctions.
Customers receive indirect assured access by submitting
their bids (competitive or non-competitive) through
GSDs. Customers may use as many GSDs as they
choose to submit their bids. PDs are awarded higher
bidding limits relative to other GSDs on the basis of
their performance at auctions and their trading activity
in secondary markets.23 Higher bidding limits go
hand-in-hand with bidding obligations for PDs, in
order to support the consistent success of auctions.
23. PDs are also the sole counterparties: (i) for the Bank of Canada’s open
market operations to support the implementation of monetary policy;
(ii) for term-repo operations that are typically conducted to offset the increase
in the demand for bank notes; and (iii) for securities lending from the Bank
of Canada’s balance sheet to temporarily support the liquidity of the Govern-
ment of Canada securities when these securities are unusually expensive on
the repo market.
Primary dealers (PDs)
For own account Treasury bills: No change $3 million No change Cut-off yield Cut-off yield 50 per cent No change
25 per cent + 5 basis + 10 basis of their maxi-
Bonds: from points** points mum bidding
10–25 per limit at every
cent auction
For customers Limited to Limited to $3 million • $10 million None No change None No change
the PD’s 25 per cent • $3 million
bidding limit of the tender for RRBs*
In aggregate Limited to No change $6 million • $13 million None No change 50 per cent No change
40 per cent • $6 million of their maxi-
of the tender for RRBs mum bidding
limit at every
auction
Government securities distributors (GSDs)
For own account Treasury bills: No change $3 million No change None No change None One successful bid
10 per cent (competitive or
Bonds: from non-competitive)
1–9 per cent every six months
on their own
behalf or on behalf
of customers
For customers Limited to Limited to $3 million • $10 million None No change None None
the greater 10 per cent • $3 million
of 5 per cent of the tender for RRBs
or the GSD’s
bidding limit
Customers 25 per cent No change $3 million $5 million None No change None No change
Table 2
Changes to the Debt Distribution Framework†
Competitive bidding limits Non-competitive bidding Acceptable price range for Minimum participation
limits submission of bids at auctions requirements
1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005
† Changes appear in bold.
* Real Return Bonds
** Secondary market yield + 5 basis points in case of strong RRB auctions; on a trial basis since 1 June 200444 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
Conclusion
The debt distribution framework is evolving in response
tochangesinmarketconditionsandinthegovernment’s
funding requirements. The trend towards greater con-
centration in both the primary and secondary markets,
along with ﬁnancial innovations, will continue to rep-
resent a challenge for the future effectiveness of the
framework. A sound and effective debt distribution
framework is key to the government’s objectives for its
debt strategy of raising stable low-cost funding and
maintaining a well-functioning market.
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